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Abstract
Arent and Nagl (2013) use the BA Employment panel 1998-2007 to
identify effects of the German Hartz reform and find that it caused a con-
siderable reduction of wages. Our replication study suggests that their
clear and strong conclusions are based on implausible assumptions re-
garding the error structure of their regression models and on a too coarse
modelling of the time effects. They become blurred and weak once bet-
ter estimates of the standard errors are obtained and the development of
wages is investigated at a finer time grid. Furthermore, Arent and Nagls’
reform effects shrink considerably when a more appropriate price index
is used to deflate the wages and when the censoring of wages is treated
correctly. Methodological considerations suggest that their conclusions
depend on several further daring and untested assumptions.
JEL classification: J08; J31; J65
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1 Introduction
In an interesting and ambitious paper, Stefan Arent and Wolfgang Nagl (2013)
analyze the effect of a decrease in unemployment benefits on wages. Their
theoretical argument goes that lowering workers’ outside options will depress
wages. They employ the Hartz IV reform as a natural experiment and claim to
find strong evidence that decreased unemployment compensation has an adverse
effect on wages.
We take issue with their finding for the following reasons. A fundamental
objection to Arent and Nagl’s approach follows from the fact that they cannot
use a standard control/treatment group approach because the Hartz reforms
∗We are greatly indebted Ekkehart Schlicht and Helmut Rudolph for helpful suggestions
and comments. We thank Stefan Arent and Wolfgang Nagl for sharing their data preprocessing
scripts with us. Their openness and willingness to cooperate facilitated our work considerably.
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affected all German employees.1 Therefore, it would have been necessary to
ensure not to confuse a supposed Hartz effect with the impact of other macro-
economic factors. To our judgement, the authors failed to do so. By pointing
to endogeneity problems, they omit central determinants of wages from their
model, as e.g. the unemployment rate. Instead they include the industry level
gross value added (per employee) in their analysis, which seems problematic
too because it is per definition a function of individual wages, the dependent
variable in their regressions.
A more detailed inspection of their approach reveals several further problems
that put the reliability and precision of their results into question. First, we find
that deflating the wages with a more appropriate price index decreases their
Hartz effect estimates considerably. Second, the precision of their results seems
to be overstated by an order of magnitude due to ignorance of clustering and
serial correlation of the residuals. Third, Arent and Nagl do not properly address
the problem that the wage variable in the data is right censored. This would
be important especially when looking at the subpopulation of highly qualified
employees, however. Fourth, modelling the development of wages at a finer time
grid reveals a downward trend of wages starting in 2004 – well before the Hartz
IV reform, which became law in 2005.2 So the time line of events alone does
not allow to make a causal claim here.
2 Arent and Nagl’s model and slight extensions
Arent and Nagl (2013) employ the BA-Emplomynent Panel 1998–2007 (but
use only the years 2000–2007 in their regression samples) to estimate wage
regressions of the form
ln(wit) = β0 + β1 LUAt + controls + ai + uit (1)
where wit denotes real monthly wages of indivual i in quarter t, LUAt is a
period dummy taking on value 1 for the years 2005–2007 (and zero otherwise),
controls contains individual, establishment and industry level control variables,3
ai denotes an individual specific fixed effect, and uit denotes a residual term.
Arent and Nagl emphasize that the Hartz reform generates quasi-
experimental conditions and argue that purging the wages from the control
variables in their model allows to interpret the coefficient of the LUA dummy
(‘Lower Unemployment Assistance’) as a measure for the effect of lowering the
unemployment assistance on wages.
We find it difficult to follow this argument due to the absence of a con-
trol group. Experimental and quasi-experimental designs usually compare the
development of a group affected by a reform (the treatment group) with that
of another group (the control group) that is subject to the same common in-
fluences except the reform. This allows the researcher to ignore influences that
1For example, the choice of an appropriate deflation measure would be a minor issue if a
German control group were available.
2the integration of the unemployment insurance with the social assistance benefits took
place in 2005 and the reduction of the maximum unemployment entitlement period became
effective in February 2006.
3The controls include age, age squared, professional status, firm size, the firms’s age struc-
ture, individual job tenure, annual values of the industry-specific gross value added per worker
and dummy variables for each quarter.
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affect both groups in the same way. Since a control group is absent here (all Ger-
man employees are affected by the reform), controlling for macro level impacts
is required.
Arent and Nagl are aware of the problem and try to tackle it by including
the industry level gross value added per worker as a macro level control. The
gross value added appears problematic as a regressor, however, since it is de-
fined as a function of wages4 and therefore must be highly correlated with the
dependent variable by construction. Arent and Nagl emphasize that controlling
for a number of individual and firm level characteristics helps to create quasi-
experimental conditions. But their controls are almost time-invariant (the skill
dummies5) or change steadily over time (the age profile, firm size dummies and
the firm’s age structure), and therefore cannot capture the effects of discrete
changes of macro shocks (as e.g. export demand).
Finally, in order to obtain consistent estimates of the precision of the Hartz
dummy coefficient, the multilevel structure of the model (it includes both micro
and macro level regressors) has to be taken into account. A closer look at the
error structure of the model suggests that the coefficient standard deviations
reported by Arent and Nagl might be underestimated by an order of magnitude
since aggregate shocks that are not represented in the regression function may
generate clustering of the residuals at the year level. Expressed formally, the
residual ui,t in model (1) should be written as uit ≡ vi,t + ηt with fixed time
effect ηt. Betrand et al. (2004) demonstrate that serial correlation of the resid-
ual component vi,t creates over-rejection problems that appear notoriously in
Difference-in-Differences estimates and recommend a moving blocks bootstrap
to tackle it. Though model (1) is not a Difference-in-Differences design, the
problems are similar or even worse here.
Even if one provisionally accepts Arent and Nagl’s assumptions regarding
the exogeneity of the regressors and the error structure, a causal interpretation
of the Hartz dummy coefficient becomes questionable if the time pattern of
purged wages is inspected directly. A finer time grid is obtained by replacing
the reform dummy LUA by a set of time dummies for the years 2003 to 2007.6
This yields the following model
ln(wit) = β0 +
2007∑
τ=2003
γτ D
(τ)
t + controls + ai + uit (2)
where D
(τ)
t is a year dummy for year τ . It takes on value 1 for all quarters of
year τ and zero otherwise.
4The GVA is computed as output at market prices minus intermediate consumption.
Clearly, wages constitute a large share of the value added.
5See our remark in the appendix.
6The year dummies for 2000 to 2002 are omitted to avoid collinearity problems with the age
terms. Extending the base improves the estimation of the age/trend component. Deviating
from Arent and Nagl (they include the age variable at yearly precision in their models), we
use the age at quarterly precision.
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3 Results
3.1 Standard error issues
As mentioned above, the standard errors reported by Arent and Nagl may be
underestimated by and order of magnitude due to the neglect of clustering and
serial correlation of the residuals. Strong serial correlation of the residuals can
be shown by regressing the estimated residuals uˆi,t on their lags uˆi,t−1. This
yields a quite high correlation of 0.8. (All results presented in our comment refer
to western German men.) That the estimated Hartz effect (the point estimate,
which can be found in row 1, column 1 of Table 1, is -0.024) seems to be much less
precise than suggested by the tiny standard error (0.0002) reported in Arent and
Nagl’s paper, can also be demonstrated by running separate regressions based on
the observations from one quarter only. They yield the reform dummy estimates
-0.018, -0.022, -0.027 and -0.029 for the first, second, third and fourth quarter,
respectively. Considering that the dummy coefficient measures an average over
the three years 2005, 2006 and 2007, it is quite irritating that the ‘Autumn’
Hartz effect exceeds the ‘Winter’ effect by roughly 60 percent.
More sensible estimates of the standard errors can be obtained from a moving
blocks bootstrap procedure (as recommended by Bertrand et al.). If blocks
containing all observations from 2, 4 or 6 successive quarters are drawn randomly
with replacement from the data, we obtain standard errors of 0.008, 0.011 and
0.014, respectively (see columns 3–5 in row 1 of Table 1). This exceeds the figure
reported by Arent and Nagl by a factor of roughly 40 to 70. Even these much
larger standard errors may overstate the precision of the estimates, however,
since the short time dimension of the data (32 waves only) puts tight limits on
the length of the bootstrap blocks.7
3.2 The role of the price index
A further issue in Arent and Nagl’s study regards the choice of the price index.
They use the harmonized price index for Germany to deflate the wages. Since
the harmonized index is developed mainly in order to improve the comparability
of price changes across European countries, it is not completely representative
for Germany. Due to the absence of a control group, the choice of the price index
may influence the results considerably. A simple comparison of the harmonized
price index with the national German consumer price index shows that this is
the case. Whereas the development of both indexes was almost identical in the
years 2000 to 2004, the growth of the harmonized index exceededs that of the
national index by 0.51 percentage points. A simple rough computation suggests
that Arent and Nagl would have obtained a considerably smaller Hartz effect of
−2.4 + 0.51 ≈ −1.9 percent if they had employed the more appropriate index.
This is confirmed by the considerably smaller Hartz dummy coefficient estimates
in rows 3 and 4 of Table 1 that are obtained from our own preparation of the
BA panel. A closer inspection reveals that the price index is the main source of
7Bertrand et al. consider a design with several treatment groups (U.S. States). Their
blocks comprise the entire time series of the observations of a state. Since we have only
one treatment group, this is not feasible for our application. Bertrand et al. note that their
bootstrap procedure performs well only if the number of states is large enough (at least 20).
See Fitzenberger (1997) for an expositon of the moving blocks bootstrap.
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Table 1: Hartz dummy coefficient estimates, obtained from estimating models
(1) for western German men. Dependent variable: log real wages.
Model/Sample Point Standard Error Estimates
Estimate Asy.a Moving Blocks Bootstrap
2 Waves 4 Waves 6 Waves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Wages Deflated with the Harmonized Consumer Price Index
A & N’s Sample -0.0240 0.0002 0.0077 0.0114 0.0143
A & N’s Sample, model
includes only age, age2
and quarter dummies -0.0232 0.0002 0.0074 0.0109 0.0117
B. Wages Deflated with the National Consumer Price Index
B.I All Skill Groups Together
Include All Censored Obs. -0.0166 0.0003 0.0053 0.0076 0.0088
Drop All Censored Obs. -0.0142 0.0003 0.0041 0.0053 0.0064
Fixed Effects Tobit -0.0077 –b – – –
B.II Separate Regressions by Skill Group (Fixed Effects Tobit Estimates)
Low Skilled -0.0093 – – – –
Medium Skilled -0.0073 – – – –
Highly Skilled -0.0054 – – – –
Data Sources: BA-Employment Panel 2000–2007, data preprocessing by Arent and Nagl (rows
1 and 2), and by Ludsteck and Seth (rows 3–8).
The models in rows 3–8 omit the gross value added per employee. All bootstrap standard
errors are obtained from 100 bootstrap replications.
Notes:
a ‘Asy’. refers to asymptotic standard errors that account for heteroscedasticity.
b Bootstrap standard errors are not computed due to prohibitively high computational costs.
the deviations between their and our results.8
3.3 The censoring problem
Further inspection of the data suggests that the Hartz dummy coefficient may be
biased by improper treatment of the wage censoring. As is well known, the wage
of the employment register data (Bescha¨ftigtenstatistik) are right-censored at
the earnings limit for social security contributions (‘Beitragsbemessungsgrenze’).
The censoring share is moderate for the entire sample, about 5 to 10 percent,
slightly varying by year. For the highly qualified men in western Germany, it
amounts to roughly 50 percent, however.9 This may bias standard OLS and
fixed effects regression models severely and therefore requires proper treatment,
e.g. by using Tobit models.
Arent and Nagl try to tackle the censoring problem heuristically by trun-
cating the sample at the 5th and 95th percentile of the unconditional wage
distribution. This is problematic for several reasons. First, the application of
standard OLS or fixed effects estimators to a truncated sample delivers still
biased results. Since roughly 50 percent of the wages are censored for the highly
qualified men in western Germany, comparing the results from standard OLS
8We obtain a Hartz effect of -0.0239 if the wages are deflated with the harmonized price
index in our data.
9See e.g. Bu¨ttner and Ra¨ssler (2008) for statistics on the censoring shares.
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or fixed effects regressions for this group with the unskilled workers (where
censoring is below 2 percent), appears to be problematic, to say the least. Sec-
ond, Arent and Nagl’s heuristic truncation procedure leaves the majority of the
censored observations in the sample if the share of right-censored observations
exceeds 5 percent, which clearly is the case for some subsamples (e.g. western
German men and the highly qualified employees). Due to an error in their pre-
processing scripts, Arent and Nagl actually drop only about 1 percent of the
top observations instead of 5 percent as reported in the paper. Third, the cen-
soring limit was increased by roughly 10 percent in 2003.10 Such year-to-year
changes may translate directly into artificial changes of period or year or dummy
coefficients if they are not tackled appropriately using Tobit models. Fourth,
truncating five percent of the wages at the bottom might drop a good deal of
low but valid wages. It deviates from the standard practice to disregard wages
of full-timers that are smaller than 100 or 200 percent of the marginal part-time
income threshold.11
In order to inspect the sensitivity of Arent and Nagl’s results to censoring
problems, we compute some further estimates of the Hartz effect. The first
two are based on standard fixed effects regression models. The first includes all
censored observations, the second drops all censored observations. The third ac-
counts for censoring using Honore´’s (1993) fixed effects Tobit estimator (details
on the implementation of Honore´’s estimator are described in the Appendix).
All three regressions are based on data from our own preprocessing due to lack
of correct censoring indicators in Arent and Nagl’s data.12 Since the harmo-
nized price index is clearly not the best choice, it is substituted by the standard
consumer price index for our alternative estimates. The results of the Tobit
regression are shown in row 5 of Table 1. Now the Hartz effect has decreased
again in magnitude, to less than one percent.
The most surprising results in Arent and Nagl’s study are derived from sep-
arate regressions by skill groups. Since these regressions are conducted even
separately for 5 industries, their results cannot be summarized in one number
per skill group. The responses of the highly skilled to the reform are, however,
greater in all industries – according to their results. For example, the Hartz
effects are -1.58 and -2.76 percent, respectively, for the low and highly skilled
men employed in the manufacturing industry. When we apply the fixed effects
Tobit estimator to the skill subsamples, our results point in the opposite di-
rection. In line with expectations from theoretical reasoning, the effect (-0.51
percent) is now even slightly smaller for the highly skilled. If the relationship
of the point estimates to their standard errors is similar to rows 1–4, all these
effects are probably insignificant, however. We note that estimating Tobit re-
gressions for samples with roughly 50 percent censored observations appears
daring. Therefore we would hesitate to believe in their results seriously even
if all other problems mentioned above were absent. They are, however, good
enough to show that Arent and Nagl’s results on the highly skilled should not
10The increase was induced by the Beitragssicherungsgesetz (BSSichG), see Bungesgeset-
zblatt, Jahrgang 2002 Teil I, Nr. 87.
11Less than 3 percent of the full-time spells are dropped even if the 200 percent threshold is
used. Note furthermore that the marginal part-time threshold was raised considerably from
325 to 400 Euro in 2003.
12The treatment of low wages in our data preprocessing follows the standard procedure to
drop wages not exceeding 200 percent of the marginal part-time income threshold.
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Figure 1: Hartz dummy coefficient estimates, obtained from estimating models
(1) and (2) for western German men. Dependent variable: log real wages.
Data Sources: BA-Employment Panel
data preprocessing by Arent and Nagl for all results based on the harmonized price index,
data preprocessing by Ludsteck and Seth for the results based on the national price index.
Legend: ‘Hartz-Dummy’ represents Arent and Nagl’s original Hartz-Dummy effect from model
(1), ‘Year Dummies’ represent estimates of the year dummy coefficients for model (2). ‘GVA
included’ and ‘GVA omitted’ indicate whether the gross value added per worker is included
or not as a control variable. All estimates are obtained using standard fixed effects models.
be taken seriously.
3.4 Reform effect estimates at a finer time grid
Since a cause should precede its effects according to common notions of causality,
it appears important to check whether the Hartz reform effect really looks like
the step function (it is represented in Figure 1) generated by Arent and Nagl’s
reform dummy specification.
We do this by estimating model (2) for wages deflated with the harmonized
price index as well as with the national index. Though the results in Table
1 suggest that the standard least squares fixed effects estimates are slightly
biased, they are employed here for the sake of simplicity. The results from this
exercise are represented by the graphs in Figure 1. We find a wage decline that
starts already in 2004 and gives no indication of a clear-cut downward jump
afterwards. If the wages are deflated with the national price index, the graph
becomes even flatter in the years 2006 and 2007. One can still argue that the
wages decreased cet. par. in the years 2005–2007, but it is hard to imagine
that a researcher who didn’t know when the reform took place, would find a
pronounced reform effect in the years 2005 to 2007 based on the year dummy
coefficients.13
13Arent and Nagl find a structural break in 2005 based on a Chow test (see page 454 of their
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In principle, Appendix Table A4 in Arent and Nagl’s paper contains already
enough information to put their interpretation of the Hartz dummy into ques-
tion. They run placebo regressions to check the validity of their hypothesis.
The placebo specifications are obtained by shifting the start of the Hartz pe-
riod dummy successively to 2004, 2003 and 2002. Whereas the coefficient of
the Hartz dummy starting in 2005 is negative (-0.024), shifting the start back-
wards to 2004 and 2003 and 2002 renders the coefficients positive (see Table A4
in their paper). Their values are -0.008, 0.0266 and 0.0213 for the respective
years 2004, 2003 and 2002 (all significant at the 1 percent level according to
the standard errors reported by Arent and Nagl). Combining these estimates
allows to retrieve the pattern of year-specific deviations from the overall trend
and clearly shows that the downward movement started already before 2005. In
general, highly significant placebo effects should not be taken as evidence of the
validity of an experimental design, even if they have the ‘wrong sign.’ Effective
placebos rather indicate the presence of ignored confounding factors.
Finally, to be perfectly clear in this important respect: The fact that we
present results from equations (1) and (2) does not mean that we consider
them as valid or appropriate models to evaluate the reform effects. Considering
the bootstrap standard errors in Table 1 the significance of the year dummy
coefficients is questionable, and exploratory regressions revealed that a longer
estimation period would be required to improve the joint estimation of the
age/trend profile and the year dummies.14 The extended model regressions are
conducted only in order to show that Arent and Nagl’s coarse step function
gives a keyhole view on the issue to be investigated and may attribute wage
changes to the reform that actually took place in advance.
4 Conclusion
Arent and Nagl have, to their merit, raised an important empirical issue: What
was the effect of the Hartz reforms on wage formation? They try to answer it
based on simple fixed effects regression models of wages on several controls and
a post-reform period dummy. Due to the absence of a control group, however,
their ceteris paribus interpretation of the reform effects is rather assumed than
ensured by appropriate control for relevant confounding factors at the macro
level. Believing in their ceteris paribus clauses is a matter of faith and seems
to be daring in several respects. Moreover, the Hartz effects depend on which
price index is used to deflate the wages, and shrinks considerably (from about
2.4 percent to 1.6 or 1.4 percent for western German male employees) if the har-
monized prize index is replaced by the more appropriate national index. If the
article). Unfortunately they do not report any further details of the test procedure. When
we performed standard Chow tests (by interacting all regressors with the period dummy and
testing for joint significance of all interaction effects) and based the test on the standard
errors returned by Stata, we obtained structural breaks for every year. Arent and Nagl try
to corroborate their finding by running additional pooled regressions based on sub-periods
before (2003) and after the reform (2007). It is, however, completely unclear what to learn
from these regressions. They are based on linear models (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2)
whereas the regressions in the main part are log-linear. If the true model is log-linear, then
the linear one must be misspecified and structural breaks may appear artificially or be hidden
as a consequence of neglected nonlinearity.
14The joint identification of age/trend and year effects is further hampered by Arent and
Nagl’s choice to use a highly balanced panel.
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computation of the standard errors is based on more general and plausible er-
ror structures, the significance of the effects becomes unclear. Slight extensions
of Arent and Nagl’s period dummy specification suggest that wages started to
decrease before the integration of unemployment security with social assistance
benefits in 2005 and the reduction of the maximum entitlement period that be-
came effective in February 2006. An assessment based on notions of causality
that are commonly applied in empirical research makes it difficult to attribute
the observed effect uniquely to the Hartz reform. Expressed in simple terms:
Arent and Nagl’s keyhole view suggests strong contours which melt away once
we open the door to get a panorama view. Given the problems with Arent and
Nagl’s analysis, their conclusion remains unconvincing.
When we account for the censoring of wages using fixed effects Tobit models,
the reform effect shrinks again (to about 0.8 percent for western German men),
and Arent and Nagl’s finding that the reform reduced the wages of the highly
skilled employees more than those of the medium and low skilled, is reversed.
Though we fight shy of interpreting our results as reform effects, they appear
more plausible in terms of models that allow for on-the-job search. With on-
the-job search, wage offers are compared to the prevailing wage rate, rather
than unemployment benefits. Given the relatively low unemployment rates of
the highly skilled workers, on-the job search seems to be of more relevance for
them than to the lower-skilled workers. This would account for the increasing
wage gap between the better skilled workers and the less skilled workers we
observe.15 In contrast, the view suggested by Arent and Nagl would suggest,
counterfactually, a narrowing wage gap between the highly skilled and the less
skilled workers in the wake of the Hartz reforms.
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A Details on the implemenation of Honore´’s
fixed effects Tobit estimator
This section provides a brief description of the fixed effects Tobit estimation
procedure.
Honore´’s estimator is formulated for time-constant left-hand side censoring
at zero only. It can be applied, however, without further changes to our data
that show time-varying right-hand censoring, by applying the well-known trans-
formation y˜it := ct − yit to our dependent variable yit ≡ ln(wit) and rewriting
the regression model in the form
y˜it = ct − xit b− ai − uit (3)
with artificial regressor ct.
16 Then we obtain a regression model with time-
constant left-censored dependent variable y˜it.
Second, Honore´’s estimator is based on time-differencing and therefore de-
viates slightly from the within-transormed fixed effects estimates that employ
differences from individual-specific means. We use lag-4 differences ∆[4]xi,t ≡
xi,t − xi,t−4. This induces a small loss information since 3 quarters are lost
compared to the lag-1 differencing ∆[1]xi,t ≡ xi,t − xi,t−1 which drops only one
quarter. It is attractive, however, as it simplifies the estimation by eliminating
seasonal effects and therefore allows us to drop the seasonal dummies from the
regression model.
A third straightforward adjustment is required since the orthogonality con-
ditions used to estimate the coefficients of Honore´’s estimator are formulated
for a single pair of waves only. To apply the estimator to a sample spanning
more that two waves, we minimize the sum of the objective functions for sev-
eral wave-pairs. To represent this formally, define Y˜t := (y˜1t, . . . , y˜Nt)
′ and
Xt := (x1t, . . . , xNt)
′. If χ2(Y˜t−4, Y˜t,∆[4]Xt b) denotes the objective function
for the wave pair (t− 4, t), the objective for the entire sample has the form
Ω =
T∑
t=4
χ2(Y˜t−4, Y˜t,∆[4]Xt b). (4)
It is minimized using a derivative-free global optimization algorithm.17
Fourth, we omit the skill dummies ‘unskilled blue collar worker,’ ‘skilled
blue collar worker’ and ‘foremen’ since they show extremely low time-variation.
They change only in 0.22 percent, 0.22 percent and 0.04 percent (sic!) of all
observations in Arent and Nagl’s data and may therefore create optimization
16The ‘coefficient’ of ct is restricted to unity in our implementation of the estimator.
17We use Nelder and Mead’s flexible polyhedron search as implemented in the computer
algebra system Mathematica. The algorithm was restarted 5 times with random starting
values in the range [−0.05; 0.05] in order to increase the likelihood to find the global minimum.
The program code is available from the authors upon request.
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problems in the Tobit models.18 Of course, we checked whether these dummies
matter as controls for the Hartz effect. Omitting them from Arent and Nagl’s
base regression (row 1 of Table 1) changes the Hartz dummy coefficient from
-0.0240 to -0.0242.
18It is clear that the skill dummies are almost time-constant since the formal qualification is
either acquired before persons enter the labour market, or it is acquired in an apprenticeship.
In the second case, the change of the qualification is not visible in the estimation sample since
then the change occurs at the end of the apprenticeship and apprenticeship spells are removed
from the estimation sample.
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